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SEPTEMBER 2, 2014

JOANNA L. GROSSMAN

The End of the Road:
The Late Anna Nicole Smith’s Quest to Inherit Is Over
Twenty years. Five times the length of the human relationship. Almost twenty times the
length of the marriage. That’s the duration of the litigation about whether Anna Nicole
Smith should share in the estate of her husband J. Howard Marshall II. The parties are
long dead—J. Howard’s death at age 90 in 1995 gave rise to the estate and litigation over
it; Anna Nicole died of a drug overdose at 39 in 2007; and J. Howard’s son (and Anna
Nicole’s nemesis), Pierce Marshall, died at age 67 in 2006. Yet the litigation waged seven
years after all the parties were dead, and it came to an end just this past month. As the
federal district court that issued the last ruling wrote, quoting Charles Dickens’s Bleak
House, “it is time for this suit to no longer ‘drag[] its weary length before the Court.”
In this column, I’ll chronicle the story from beginning to end—and explain why, after
twenty years of litigation, Anna Nicole (or, more practically, the surviving daughter who
inherited her estate) came up empty handed.
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Humble Beginnings: Guess Model Seeks Share of a Billionaire Husband’s
Estate
Anna Nicole Smith met J. Howard Marshall II in 1991 at a strip club. He had transformed
himself from a law school professor into an oil tycoon, and she from an unknown into,
eventually, a Guess jeans model and then a reality star. But along the way, she was a strip
club dancer who was relegated to the dayshift because she was “bigboned”; and he, in his
very late eighties, frequented strip clubs at lunch because he would doze off too early in
the evenings.
They married in 1994. Fourteen months later, J. Howard died, but even before he passed
away, Anna Nicole had filed an action in probate court to challenge his son Pierce’s
alleged interference with J. Howard’s handling of his plentiful assets. Central to her claim
in that lawsuit (as well as a competing lawsuit that would later be litigated in federal court
in California) was that when J. Howard asked Anna Nicole to marry him, he promised her
half of his estate. But Pierce, resentful that his very aged father would give that kind of
https://verdict.justia.com/2014/09/02/endroad
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money to a woman barely more than a quarter his age, took steps to prevent the promise
from being fulfilled. And the steps he took, Anna Nicole alleged, were fraudulent and
perhaps criminal—but effective to deprive her of any share of her late husband’s estate.
Before J. Howard met Anna Nicole, he had established a living trust into which he had
put the bulk of his money. This “testamentary substitute” allows a person to retain as
many of the benefits of ownership as he wants during life, and then to pass the property
to named beneficiaries at death without the need for probate. Pierce’s interference,
according to Anna Nicole, was that he forced his father to convert the trust to an
irrevocable one, which deprived him of the ability to amend it to add her as a beneficiary,
terminate it to free up the assets and make her a lifetime gift, or make a bequest to her of
the amount allegedly promised. This conversion, then, froze in time—perhaps against his
will—his estate planning desires expressed before he met his new wife.
Across State Lines: Court Battles in Texas and California
With her probate claim still underway in Texas, Anna Nicole filed for voluntary
bankruptcy in California in 1996, necessitated by an $850,000 default judgment against
her in a sexual harassment suit filed by her former nanny. In what would prove to be a
grave tactical error, Pierce filed a claim on Anna Nicole’s bankruptcy estate, as a potential
creditor. He claimed that she had defamed him by accusing him of forgery, fraud, and
false imprisonment in connection with her probate claim, and he wanted to make sure
any damages he might be entitled to would not be discharged because of the bankruptcy.
Anna Nicole argued the truth as her defense—that he was not a potential creditor because
there had been no defamation. She also filed a counterclaim, alleging that Pierce had
wrongfully interfered with J. Howard’s promise of a substantial gift to Anna Nicole. Thus,
the question whether Pierce had wrongfully interfered with his father’s estate planning
became an issue to be resolved by the bankruptcy court.
The rest of the story all revolves around one thing: different results in dueling lawsuits. In
December 2000, the bankruptcy court ruled that Pierce had, indeed—as Anna Nicole had
contended—wrongfully interfered with Anna Nicole’s possible inheritance and was liable
to her for $474 million. But in March 2001, a Texas jury reached the opposite conclusion
—Pierce, that jury found, had done nothing wrong; he was entitled to keep his
inheritance, and Anna Nicole was entitled to nothing.
The federal district court in California, where bankruptcy court appeals goes next, upheld
the court’s findings, but reduced the damages to a mere $88 million. The question, then,
was whether Anna Nicole should get that amount, per the California court, or nothing,
per the Texas court. Fourteen years and two trips to the U.S. Supreme Court later, it
seems as if the final answer is “nothing”.
https://verdict.justia.com/2014/09/02/endroad
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Which Ruling Gets Priority? Complicated Questions about Jurisdiction
Anna Nicole did not appeal the Texas ruling—mistakenly thinking her California
judgment was secure—but Pierce did appeal the California federal bankruptcy court
ruling. And that appeal has had a long life of its own—tasked with deciding which of the
dueling judgments should control the outcome.
The first time through the appellate process, the focus was on jurisdiction. Pierce had
successfully argued, before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, that the
federal bankruptcy court had never had jurisdiction to consider Anna Nicole’s claim of
tortious interference in the first place, rendering its judgment void. He relied on the so
called “probate exception” to federal court jurisdiction. But Anna Nicole successfully
appealed this ruling to the U.S. Supreme Court.
For centuries, the Supreme Court has recognized a “probate exception” (as well as a
“domestic relations exception”) to the exercise of federal “diversity” jurisdiction. This
means, in effect, that even when the usual criteria for federal diversity jurisdiction are
met—that is, when a case involves citizens of different states, and there is a sufficiently
high amount in controversy—federal courts still cannot hear cases involving the probate
of wills.
In Marshall v. Marshall (http://supreme.justia.com/us/547/04
1544/opinion.html) (2006), the Supreme Court ruled that whatever the scope of the
probate exception, it was not implicated in this case. Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion
noted the “misty understandings of English legal history” relating to the exception, but
ultimately concluded that the exception is limited to cases where the bankruptcy court
probates or annuls a will or other testamentary instrument; assumes in rem jurisdiction
over a particular piece of property; disposes of property already in the custody of a
probate court; or otherwise directly interferes with the work of a probate court. None of
these circumstances was applicable, so the bankruptcy court was not only free to have
heard the case—but implored to exercise jurisdiction, which is not a matter of right but of
obligation.
The question then shifted from jurisdiction to timing: which ruling came first, Texas’s or
California’s? But that seemingly simple question of dates devolved into another set of
complicated legal questions. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the Ninth Circuit
for “proceedings consistent with this opinion,” an often simplistic command to just
implement the Court’s decision. But, here, the Ninth Circuit had to reach a legal question
it had deferred—whether the December 2001 decision from the bankruptcy court was
“final,” and thus entitled to precedence over the Texas ruling that came three months
later. The first ruling would have preclusive effect on the second, but a ruling is “first”
https://verdict.justia.com/2014/09/02/endroad

4/7

3/13/2015

The End of the Road: | Joanna L. Grossman | Verdict | Legal Analysis and Commentary from Justia

only if it is final, and only if it is issued by a court with the power to issue such a
judgment.
Whether the bankruptcy court had the authority to issue a final judgment on the state
law tortious interference claim turned on whether it was deemed a “core” or “noncore”
proceeding, with respect to her filing for bankruptcy. (Under the Bankruptcy Act, federal
bankruptcy courts have the authority to issue final judgments on core claims, but only
proposed findings on noncore claims. Proposed findings must be approved and made
final by a federal district court, which stands above a federal bankruptcy court.) The
core/noncore distinction was crucial because of the importance of timing—the
bankruptcy court’s ruling was before the Texas jury’s verdict, but the federal district
court’s affirmance was afterwards.
The district court took the view that the ruling on Anna Nicole’s counterclaim was non
core, which led it to conduct an independent review of the claim and, though it agreed
that she was entitled to a judgment in her favor, to rely on an entirely different measure
of damages. But the core/noncore issue was not considered on appeal, because the Ninth
Circuit ruled instead on the basis of the probate exception, discussed above. After being
rebuked by the Supreme Court on the applicability of the probate exception, the Ninth
Circuit then reached the question of whether Anna Nicole’s counterclaim was a core or
noncore proceeding. In that ruling, the court held that a bankruptcy court may only issue
a final judgment if the matter both “meets Congress’ definition of a core proceeding” and
“arises under or arises in” the bankruptcy code. It concluded that counterclaims cannot
be finally determined by a bankruptcy court unless they are “so closely related to [a
creditor’s] proof of claim that the resolution of the counterclaim is necessary to resolve
the allowance or disallowance of the claim itself.” Anna Nicole’s counterclaim against
Pierce, according to the Ninth Circuit, did not meet this test.
The U.S. Supreme Court again granted review in the case and ruled Anna Nicole’s
counterclaim was “core” under the relevant bankruptcy code provision, but held that the
statutory designation of such claims as “core” was an unconstitutional usurpation of the
power of Article III courts (federal courts comprised of judges with life tenure and salary
protection). Congress cannot withdraw jurisdiction from Article III courts willynilly,
since their very existence is one of the touchstones of separation of powers and the checks
and balances that preserve democratic rule. After a lengthy and technical analysis of
conflicting precedents, the Supreme Court thus concluded, in a 54 ruling in Stern v.
Marshall, that Anna Nicole’s counterclaim was one that could not constitutionally be
relegated to bankruptcy court. Even then, three years ago, Chief Justice John Roberts
began the majority opinion with his own quotes from Bleak House—noting that the
original parties had “died out of it,” and the “suit has, in course of time, become so
https://verdict.justia.com/2014/09/02/endroad
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complicated, that . . . no two . . . lawyers can talk about it for five minutes, without coming
to a total disagreement as to all the premises.”
The Aftermath: What Could Be Left to Fight About?
After Anna Nicole’s loss on her second (postmortem) trip to the Supreme Court, the case
was remanded yet again. Because of that second ruling, the ruling in Texas was deemed
first to the punch—and thus the binding determination of the facts. As a matter of law,
then, Pierce did not tortiously interfere with his father’s estate planning. But her
survivors did not give up. On remand, her lawyer, Howard Stern (not the Howard Stern)
moved for sanctions against Pierce’s estate for alleged litigation wrongdoing—everything
from intentional delay to manipulation of a federal judge to backdating and destroying
documents. The damages for this behavior, Stern claimed, amounted to over $44 million.
The basic theory underlying the motion was that but for the delay tactics and wrongful
behavior, the bankruptcy ruling would have been affirmed by the federal district court
earlier—and, more importantly, before the Texas jury verdict in 2001. The alleged delays,
in other words, destroyed Anna Nicole’s case because of the unusual importance of
timing.
Litigation over the sanctions motion went on for almost three years. During much of that
time, the court was insisting that Howard Stern provide more detail about the alleged
misconduct and the actual harm it caused. Stern demurred many times, insisting that all
would be revealed at an evidentiary hearing. But in the end, the judge was not satisfied
with the proffered evidence.
Although the judge seemed satisfied that Pierce’s lawyer, Edwin Hunter, had behaved in
ways that merited sanctions—his conduct was described as “perjurious, obfuscating, and
execrable”—Anna Nicole’s estate had entered into a private settlement agreement with
Hunter. Thus, it was only Pierce’s conduct at stake in the sanctions proceeding. With
respect to him, the court announced “an impasse.” Although Pierce had not presented any
dispositive basis for dismissing the motion for sanctions, Stern had not successfully
established the facts that would justify sanctions in any amount, much less more than
$44 million. (Even if those facts were established, the court doubted it could impose
sanctions in that amount without converting them from civil to criminal sanctions and
triggering due process protections.)
Conclusion
In the end, though this court was “not immune to the equitable pleas from [Anna
Nicole’s] estate,” it declined to follow “one’s heart or one’s conscience,” and instead
dismissed the motion for sanctions. The case for sanctions hadn’t been made, and it is
https://verdict.justia.com/2014/09/02/endroad
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“neither reasonable nor practical to go forward.” Thus spells the end of a story of a short
marriage, both timely and untimely deaths, and an inexorably long fight.
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